UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

4-17-2013

State v. Hathaway Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40097

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Hathaway Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40097" (2013). Not Reported. 986.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/986

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA~ n

)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

No. 40097

COPY

Payette Co. Case No.
CR-2008-176

)
)
)
)

JEREMY HATHAWAY,
Defendant-Appellant.

_____________ )

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF PAYETTE

HONORABLE SUSAN E. WIEBE
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P .0. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case ............................................................................. 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ................... 1
ISSUES ........................................................................................................... 5
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 6
I.

II.

Hathaway Has Failed To Establish That The Idaho
Supreme Court Violated His Constitutional Rights
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate
Record ....................................................................................... 6
A.

Introduction ..................................................................... 6

B.

Standard Of Review ........................................................ 6

C.

Hathaway Has Shown No Violation Of His Due
Process, Equal Protection Or Effective Assistance
Of Counsel Rights ........................................................... 6

Hathaway Has Failed To Establish That The District
Court Abused Its Discretion By Executing His Sentence
Without Reduction Upon Its Revocation Of His Third
Period Of Probation ................................................................. 13
A.

Introduction ................................................................... 13

B.

Standard Of Review ...................................................... 13

C.

The District Court Acted Within Its Sentencing
Discretion ...................................................................... 13

CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................ 16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

CASES

Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) ......................................................... 7
Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms and Paroles,
357 U.S. 214 (1958) ...................................................................................7
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) ......................................................................7
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) ..................................................................... 7
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) .................................................................... 7
Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2002) ..............................................................7
State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324,834 P.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1992) .......................... 13
State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 79 P.3d 734 (Ct. App. 2003) .......................... 6
State v. Cornelison,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d _ , 2013 WL 163523 (Idaho App.,
2013.) ...................................................................................... 7, 8, 9, 10
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 218 P.3d 5 (Ct. App. 2009) ............... 10, 13, 14
State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 783 P .2d 315 (Ct. App. 1989) ............................ 13
State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 288 P.3d 835 (Ct. App. 2012) ................. passim
State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 23 P.3d 786 (Ct. App. 2001) ................................ 6
State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927,104 P.3d 969 (2005) ......................................... 14
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 50 P.3d 472 (2002) ............................................. 6
State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 582 P.2d 728 (1978) ............................................ 14

RULES
I.A.R. 28 .............................................................................................................. 11
I.A.R. 29 .............................................................................................................. 11

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jeremy Hathaway appeals from the district court's denial of his oral I.C.R.
35 motion to reduce his sentence following the court's revocation of his
probation.

He also challenges the Idaho Supreme Court's order denying his

motion to augment the appellate record.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Early in the morning of January 19, 2008, Payette County police officer
Dustin Derrick observed Hathaway and two other individuals running from the
area of Jerry's Market in Payette.

(5/23/08 PSl, 1 pp.1-2, 18.) Officer Derrick

approached and spoke with the individuals, from whom he could smell the odor
of alcoholic beverages. (Id.)
During his contact with the individuals, Officer Derrick learned through
dispatch that a truck that was parked beside Jerry's Market had been broken
into. (5/23/08 PSI, pp.2, 18.) The owner of the truck had previously called 911,
and reported that he observed three males break into the truck and then run
away.

(Id.)

Officer Derrick called for the assistance of another officer who

investigated the truck and observed evidence that the three individuals kicked out
the truck's back window and then attempted to hotwire it. (5/23/08 PSI, pp.1819.) Officers placed Hathaway and the two other individuals under arrest and
transported them to the police station. · (5/23/08 PSI, p.19.) There, Hathaway
PSI page citations are numbered sequentially from the first page, including
attachments.
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admitted that he and the other two individuals had attempted to steal the truck.
(Id.) A breathalyzer test revealed Hathaway's BAC to be .094. (Id.)
The state charged Hathaway with aiding and abetting burglary and minor
in possession of alcohol.

(R., pp.30, 60-61.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement,

Hathaway pied guilty to an amended charge of attempted burglary, and the state
dismissed the minor in possession of alcohol charge. (R., pp.66-70; 5/6/08 Tr.,
p.4, L.12 - p.13, L.13.) The district court imposed a unified four-year sentence
with one and one-half years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed
Hathaway on probation for four years. (R., pp.94-103.) The court also granted
Hathaway's probation officer the authority to request up to 270 discretionary jail
days, and ordered Hathaway pay restitution for the damage to the victim's truck.
(Id.)
Over the next year and a half, the district court approved 13 probation
department requests for the imposition of approximately 239 discretionary jail
days.

(R., pp.109-122.)

These requests were based on allegations that

Hathaway: failed to obtain employment, failed to complete required treatment,
failed to report to and follow the directives of his probation officer, consumed
alcohol, moved without permission, possessed marijuana, and obtained a new
criminal charge for battering a fellow inmate while serving discretionary jail time.
(R., pp.109-122, 143-144.)

In March 2010, the state filed its first motion for probation violation. (R.,
pp.123-147.) Hathaway admitted violating his probation. (R., pp.155-156.) The
district court revoked Hathaway's probation and imposed his original sentence,
2

but retained jurisdiction for six months. (R., pp.157-161.) At the conclusion of
the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended Hathaway's
sentence and placed him back on supervised probation. (R., pp.168-173.)
Three months later, Hathaway failed to appear at a scheduled review
hearing.

(R., p.176.)

Shortly thereafter, the state filed its second motion for

probation violation. (R., pp.177-184.) The state alleged that Hathaway moved
without permission, failed to seek and maintain employment, failed to complete
required treatment, and failed to pay required fines, fees, and restitution.

(Id.)

Hathaway admitted violating his probation. (R., pp.196-197.) The district court
revoked and reinstated Hathaway's probation. (R., pp.198-199.)
Approximately 10 months later, Hathaway was arrested and charged with
misdemeanor domestic battery and malicious injury to property following a
confrontation with his girlfriend.

(R., pp.201-202, 210-217.)

Based on these

charges, and Hathaway's continuing failure to pay required fines, fees, and
restitution, the state filed its third motion for probation violation. (R., pp.202-217.)
Hathaway pied guilty to domestic battery and subsequently admitted violating his
probation in the attempted burglary case. (5/11/12 PSI, pp.2, 4; R., pp.222-225.)
During the disposition hearing, Hathaway's counsel suggested several possible
disposition outcomes to the district court, including revoking

Hathaway's

probation but converting his sentence to county jail time, and converting six
months of Hathaway's determinate sentence to indeterminate time. (6/1/12 Tr.,
p.15, L.18 - p.16, L.22.) Instead, the district court revoked Hathaway's probation

3

and imposed the original unified four-year sentence with one and one-half years
fixed. (R., p.231.) Hathaway timely appealed. (R., pp.237-239.)
After the appellate record was settled, Hathaway filed a motion to suspend
the briefing schedule and to augment the record with as-yet unprepared
transcripts of the evidentiary/admission and disposition hearings associated with
his first and second probation violation proceedings.

(11/16/12 Motion.)

The

state filed an objection. (11/20/12 Objection.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied
Hathaway's motion with regard to each ·of the requested transcripts. (11/27/12
Order.)

4

ISSUES
Hathaway states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Hathaway due
process and equal protection when it denied his Motion to
Augment with transcripts necessary for review of the issues
on appeal?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Hathaway's oral Rule 35 motion requesting leniency?

(Appellant's brief, p.4)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Hathaway failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated
his constitutional rights when it denied his motion to augment the appellate
record?

2.

Has Hathaway failed to establish that the district court abused its
discretion by executing his sentence without reduction upon its revocation
of his third period of probation?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
Hathaway Has Failed To Establish That The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His
Constitutional Rights When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate
Record

A.

Introduction
Hathaway contends that the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his motion to

augment the appellate record with as-yet unprepared transcripts of court
hearings associated with his first and second periods of supervised probation
violated his due process, equal protection, and effective assistance of counsel
rights.

(Appellant's brief, pp.5-19.)

However, application of the relevant law

reveals that Hathaway has failed to establish any violation of his constitutional
rights.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one

of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App.
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).
C.

Hathaway Has Shown No Violation Of His Due Process, Equal Protection
Or Effective Assistance Of Counsel Rights
A defendant in a criminal case has a due process right to "a record on

appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged
regarding the proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d
6

472, 477 (2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v.
Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms
and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)); see also
State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, _ , 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). State
v. Cornelison, _
2013.)

Idaho_, _

P.3d _ , 2013 WL 163523 (Idaho App.,

The state, however, "will not be required to expend its funds

unnecessarily" to provide transcripts that "will not be germane to consideration of
the appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102,
123 (1996) (indigent appellant has right to "a transcript of relevant trial
proceedings").

Rather, an indigent defendant is entitled, at state expense, to

only those transcripts and portions of the record necessary to pursue the issues
raised on appeal. Griffin, 351 U.S. 12; Lane, 372 U.S. 477. To show prejudice
Hathaway "must present something more than gross speculation that the
transcripts were requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 605 (6th
Cir. 2002).
In Morgan, the Idaho Court of Appeals rejected Morgan's contention that
the Idaho Supreme Court violated his constitutional rights in denying his motion
to augment the appellate record with transcripts of hearings associated with the
first of his two probation violation proceedings. Morgan, 153 Idaho at _ , 288
P.3d at 837-839. At the outset, the Idaho Court of Appeals "disclaim[ed) any
authority to review, and, in effect, reverse an Idaho Supreme Court decision
made on a motion made prior to assignment of the case to [the Idaho Court of
Appeals] on the ground that the Supreme Court decision was contrary to the
7

state or federal constitutions or other law."

!st at_,

288 P.3d at 837. Such an

undertaking, the Court explained, "would be tantamount to the Court of Appeals
entertaining an 'appeal' from an Idaho Supreme Court decision and is plainly
beyond the purview of this Court."

kl_; see also Cornelison, 2013 WL at 2-3

(rejecting Cornelison's challenge that I.AR. 108(a) granted the Idaho Court of
Appeals the implicit authority to review the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his
motion to augment the appellate record).
However, the Idaho Court of Appeals did leave open the possibility of
review of such motions in some circumstances.

!st

Such circumstances may

occur, the Court indicated, where "the completed briefs have refined, clarified, or
expanded issues on appeal in such a way as to demonstrate the need for
additional records or transcripts, or where new evidence is presented to support
a renewed motion."

kl

Should the Idaho Court of Appeals be assigned this case, it lacks the
authority to review the Idaho Supreme Court's order.

In addition, Hathaway's

Appellant's brief has failed to demonstrate the need for additional records and
transcripts, and he has not presented any evidence to support a renewed motion
to augment the record. Hathaway's argument in his Appellant's brief as to why
the record should be augmented with the transcripts at issue constitute
essentially the same arguments he presented to the Idaho Supreme Court in his
motion - that the district court may have relied on statements or evidence from
those hearings in making its subsequent sentencing decision.
11 /16/12 Motion with Appellant's brief, pp.5-19.)
8

(Compare

Hathaway acknowledges Morgan, but contends that "the Morgan Court's
statement that Mr. Morgan could have filed a renewed motion to augment directly
with the Court of Appeals [in order to demonstrate the need for additional records
or transcripts] is contrary to the Appellate Rules [which permit parties to file
appellate motions only with the Idaho Supreme Court."] (Appellant's brief, pp.1314, n.2.)

However, the Idaho Court of Appeals recently rejected a nearly

identical argument in Cornelison:
We reject that interpretation of the rule because we
recognize this to be contrary to the grant of authority in Idaho
Appellate Rule 101. That rule provides in part, "The Idaho Appellate
Rules shall apply to all proceedings in the Court of Appeals as well
as the following rules." I.A.R. 101. By way of Rule 101, this Court
also has authority to entertain motions to augment the record as
provided by Rule 30 after the case has been assigned to this Court.
Moreover, if we were to accept Cornelison's interpretation, it would
result in a lack of authority of this Court to entertain any motions.
Idaho Appellate Rule 32(c), applicable to the Court of Appeals via
Rule 101, allows any other motions permitted under the rules, other
than a motion to dismiss, to be made at any time, before or after
the case is set for oral argument. By way of that authority, this
Court routinely rules on motions such as motions for continuance,
motions regarding briefing (including motions to join briefing, file
supplemental briefing, exceed the page limits, revise a brief,
request an extension of time to file a brief, or request permission to
file a late brief), motions to expedite the appeal, motions to
withdraw as counsel, motions for a stay of proceedings, motions to
augment the record, renewed motions to augment the record, and
motions to allow or to vacate oral argument. Under the Idaho
Appellate Rules, we have the authority to review and rule on
motions made by a party after the case has been assigned to this
Court.
In sum, we adhere to our conclusion in Morgan that
reviewing the denial of a motion to augment the record by the
Supreme Court is beyond the scope of our authority. If a party files
9

a renewed motion after the case assignment to this Court and
presents new information or justification for the motion, we have the
authority to rule on the motion.
Cornelison, 2013 WL at 4. 2
Because the Idaho Court of Appeals lacks the authority to review, and, in
effect, reverse a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court, and because Hathaway
has failed to file a renewed motion or provide any new evidence or clarification in
his Appellant's brief regarding his request to augment the record, the Idaho Court
of Appeals must decline, if it is assigned this case, to review the Idaho Supreme
Court's denial of Hathaway's motion to augment the record.
To the extent this Court considers the merits of Hathaway's constitutional
claims, all of his arguments fail.

Hathaway's appeal is timely only from the

district court's June 7, 2012 "Judgment and Commitment on Probation Violation."
(See R., pp.234-235, 237-239.)

On appeal, Hathaway challenges only the

district court's decision not to reduce his sentence upon the final revocation of his
probation. (See generally Appellant's brief.)

The existing appellate record

includes transcripts of Hathaway's arraignment, admission, and disposition
hearings associated with this final probation violation.

(4/6/12 Tr.; 4/20/12 Tr.;

6/1/12 Tr.) The record also includes transcripts of Hathaway's change and plea
and sentencing hearings from the underlying attempted burglary case; court
minutes from each of the hearings that were the subject of his motion to augment

2

The Idaho Court of Appeals also noted that in addition to filing a renewed
motion to augment the record, or expanding or clarifying his augmentation
request in his appellant's brief, Cornelison also had the right to file a petition for
review of its decision with the Supreme Court. Cornelison, 2013 WL at 2, n.2.
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the record; two PSls; and the APSI conducted after the period of retained
jurisdiction. (See generally R.; 5/6/08 Tr.; 10/17/08 Tr.; 5/23/08 PSI; 5/11/12 PSI;
10/19/10 APSI.)
Hathaway nevertheless contends this available information is inadequate
for appellate review of his claims. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-19.) However, each of
the hearings associated with Hathaway's transcript request occurred prior to his
third period of probation.

(11/16/12 Motion.)

The district court did not have

transcripts of these hearings at the time it elected to revoke Hathaway's
probation and execute his sentence without reduction, and there is no indication
that the district court actually relied on anything that was said at these prior
hearings in making this sentencing determination.
Hathaway appears to assert that State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 218
P.3d 5 (Ct. App. 2009), which requires appellate review of the entire record of
proceedings in the trial court up to and including the final revocation of probation,
entitles him to transcripts of each of the hearings conducted throughout his
criminal proceedings. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-13.)

However, as explained in

Morgan, such an interpretation of Hanington is too broad. Morgan, 153 Idaho at
_ , 288 P.3d at 838. The Court of Appeals clarified that although it "will not
arbitrarily confine [itself] to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation ... that does not mean that a// proceedings in
the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane."
original).

&

(emphasis

Rather, "[t]he focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial

court's decision to revoke probation."

kl
11

Accordingly, the Court "will consider

the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of
probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal."

~

Because all relevant information to the district court's decision not to reduce
Hathaway's sentence upon revocation of his probation is already included in the
record on appeal, Hathaway has failed to show any due process violation
resulting from the Supreme Court's order denying his motion to augment the
record.
Additionally, Hathaway was afforded all the process he was due in
relation to the preparation of the appellate record before the record was settled.
As noted in Morgan, 'The parties to an appeal have twenty-eight days from the
service of the record to request additions or corrections to the record, Idaho
Appellate Rule 29(a)."

~

at _ , 288 P.3d at 838-839.

"[Hathaway] was

afforded the opportunity to designate not only the standard clerk's record, but
also additional records necessary for inclusion in the clerk's record on appeal.
I.AR. 28 (a), (c)."

~

Therefore, "[Hathaway] was provided the process by which

he could designate all documents in the record necessary for appeal .... "

kl

Although the appellate rules also "provide[] that a party may move the Supreme
Court to add to the settled clerk's record, nothing therein creates a right to such
augmentation."

~

For these reasons, the Idaho Court of Appeals has rejected

the proposition that "the ability to designate records necessary for appellate
review under I.AR. 28 [is] insufficient to afford due process."
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kl

Hathaway's equal protection argument also lacks merit.

The Court in

Morgan rejected the argument that equal protection mandates augmentation of
all transcripts the appellant desires, stating:
Morgan was not denied the transcripts because of indigency.
Morgan was afforded the opportunity to designate not only the
standard clerk's record, but also additional records necessary for
inclusion in the clerk's record on appeal. He had time to review the
record and make any objections, corrections, additions, or deletions
prior to settling of the record, pursuant to I.AR. 29(a). Morgan's
failure to fully and timely utilize the Idaho Appellate Rules, and his
failure to demonstrate the need for the transcripts in his motion to
augment the record, precluded him from including the first
probation violation hearing transcripts, not his indigency. Morgan's
motion to augment failed to make a showing that any appellant,
indigent or otherwise, would be entitled to the record as requested.
lg_. at_, 288 P.3d at 839. Hathaway's equal protection claim fails for the same
reasons.
Finally, the Court in Morgan also rejected the assertion that the denial of a
motion to augment the record on appeal results in the deprivation of the effective
assistance of counsel. lg_. Hathaway, like Morgan, "has failed to demonstrate
how effective assistance of counsel is not possible without the requested
transcripts."

kl

The appellate record in this case is more than adequate to review
Hathaway's claims that the district court abused its discretion by declining to
reduce his sentence following the revocation of his probation. In addition,
Hathaway has failed to show any violations of his equal protection and ineffective
assistance of counsel rights.

He has therefore failed to show that the Idaho

Supreme Court violated his constitutional rights by denying his motion to
augment the appellate record
13

11.
Hathaway Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
By Executing His Sentence Without Reduction Upon Its Revocation Of His Third
Period Of Probation
A.

Introduction
Hathaway contends that the district court abused its discretion by

declining his request to reduce his sentence upon its revocation of his probation.
(Appellant's brief, pp.19-20.)

Hathaway has failed to establish an abuse of

discretion because the record supports the disrict court's sentencing decision.
B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether to reduce an underlying sentence upon the

revocation of probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Hanington, 148
Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7.

C.

The District Court Acted Within Its Sentencing Discretion
Upon revoking a defendant's probation, a court may order the original

sentence executed or reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal Rule
35.

Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7.

(citing State v. Beckett, 122

Idaho 324, 326, 834 P .2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Marks, 116 Idaho
976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989)). A court's decision not to reduce a
sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject to the well-established
standards governing whether a sentence is excessive. Hanington, 148 Idaho at
28, 218 P.3d at 7. Those standards require an appellant to "establish that, under
any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive considering the
objectives of criminal punishment."

State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104
14

P.3d 969, 975 (2005).

Those objectives are: "(1) protection of society; (2)

deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe,
99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). The reviewing court "will examine
the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment,"
i.e., "facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring
between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation."

Hanington,

148 Idaho at 29, 218 P.3d at 8.
In this case, the district court's decision to reduce Hathaway's sentence
upon its revocation of his probation was reasonable in light of Hathaway's
continuous failure to abide by the terms of his supervision despite multiple
opportunities.

Hathaway had the benefit and opportunity of three separate

periods of probation, but violated his probation in all three instances.

(R.,

pp.155-156; 196-197; pp.222-225.) He also had the opportunity to participate in
the retained jurisdiction program. (See generally APSI.)
Hathaway continued to commit crimes while he was on probation. In the
time since Hathaway entered his guilty plea in the underlying attempted burglary
case, Hathaway was charged and convicted of two counts of burglary (in
Oregon), possession of marijuana, disturbing the peace (amended from battery),
and misdemeanor domestic battery. (5/11/12 PSI, p.4.)
Hathaway has also demonstrated that he is not amendable to treatment,
and thus not a candidate for an earlier release from his incarceration or from his
supervision requirements.

Hathaway was removed from the Harbor House
15

program after he violated house rules, refused opportunities for work, and acted
in a rude and disrespectful manner towards other house residents. (R., p.145.)
Hathaway was also dropped from the Integrity Therapeutic Services and Bell
Counseling programs after failing to appear for appointments. (R., pp.146-147.)
The district court reasonably determined Hathaway was no longer a viable
candidate for community supervision and that no reduction in Hathaway's
sentence was appropriate. Hathaway's demonstrated inability or unwillingness to
comply with the law and the terms of his probation did not entitle him to a
reduction of his underlying sentence. Hathaway has failed to establish that his
sentence as imposed is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the sentence imposed
upon the district court's revocation of Hathaway's probation.
DATED this 17th day of April, 2013.

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of April 2013, served a true
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addressed to:
SHAWN F. WILKERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

MARK W. OLSON
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